The Future of War: World War IV Has Already Begun

“War is the continuation of politics by other means,” said Clausewitz. The entire history of the world shows the opposite: Politics is the continuation of war by other means…

From competition to armed confrontation, war has always been there. Whether military, economic, or civilizational, clashes between powers never cease.

Since 1980, after the end of the Cold War (WW III), the West believed war was behind us.

Yes, there were armed conflicts, but they were far away: Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East,… And under American dominance, we politely drew a veil over economic warfare.

The war in Ukraine—the first high-intensity conflict in 80 years at the heart of Europe—and the rise in tensions (Taiwan, Iran…) have shaken the West and exposed its weakness.

Are we, as some proclaim, on the brink of World War IV?

We must face the facts: World War IV is not looming. It is already here!

We see it every day. On the battlefields of Ukraine, in the depths of the ports of Shanghai, Singapore, or Rotterdam, at the heart of Silicon Valley’s digital accelerators, in the secrecy of economic deliberations within China’s Politburo or the European Commission—it is the balance of power between nations that is constantly being played out.

In the face of today’s rising tensions, should we fear an escalation to extremes?

As deterrence fades, that risk is real (1).
But as we have highlighted throughout the Future of War series—and now, in its conclusion—we must recognize that we have entered a new dimension: HYPERWAR.

What defines it?

• The multiplicity of theaters of operation on multidimensional chessboards.

• The rise of AI, which will profoundly reshape conflicts—from asymmetric precision warfare to cognitive war, from the very transformation of the enemy itself to the mutation of geostrategic power balances.

In this shadow war, where do we stand?

The bombastic declarations of Trump and the increase in US defense budgets should not fool anyone.

Confronted with the rise of the BRICS and the limits of their own industrial and financial capacities, the United States is coming to terms with the fact that the era of its global dominance is over. The new US defense plans make it clear: behind an aggressive communications front, they are planning a gradual disengagement from Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and a strategic retreat into the West and the American continent (2).

Make no mistake: this is anything but a peaceful withdrawal. From leonine tributes imposed on vassals, to territorial ambitions in Greenland and Canada, to security control designs in Panama, Venezuela, and perhaps even Mexico tomorrow—the imperial will of the United States is stronger than ever. Washington fully intends to rule supreme at the heart of its sphere of influence.

But behind it all, what is taking shape is a new Yalta.

How might this evolve? What can we foresee over the long term?

As so often, it is worth looking at the long arc of history.

• China’s current renaissance should come as no surprise. Even if the speed of its recovery is unmatched to date, China has always been the world’s center. It is merely reclaiming a central position it held for millennia, thanks to a singular civilization that combined—paradoxically—a deep culture of collective coordination with violent Darwinian competition at home (3). It would be dangerous to naïvely assume the benevolence of its rise. Behind its rhetoric of “win-win” cooperation with other nations lies an iron will to power as relentless as that of the United States. Its history—and its science fiction—attest to this (4).

• Likewise, great civilizations once eclipsed by the rise of the West are reawakening: India, Turkey, Iran… Even if they still have weaknesses, they clearly harbor a spirit of revanche, and they must be reckoned with. Russia as well.

Looking at the trend lines, the rise of a multipolar world is inevitable, profoundly reshaping the geostrategic chessboard. And in this world—as we highlighted in A Tale of Two Continents—European nations are losing ground. 

Is the game already decided?

As always, nothing is ever definitively set.

Who would have believed in 1946 that Japan and Germany would so quickly rise from their ashes? In 1965, that a tiny city-state without resources like Singapore would, within decades, become the third most prosperous nation on earth? In 1998, that Russia, amid total collapse, would so rapidly regain power?

While some major trends can be forecast with relative confidence (natural resources, demographics…), there are always imponderables. “Unknown unknowns” that we cannot yet imagine.

Peter Turchin shows in The Great Holocene Transformation (5): it is war and innovation that have shifted the balance of power among civilizations, empires, and nations throughout history. Contrary to popular belief, it is no longer certain that the West holds the advantage today. Yet the West still possesses a unique Faustian culture that could produce surprises (6).

Other rising powers may also stand out. Historically, it is often third actors who have gained most from rivalries between great powers. In today’s confrontation between the two global giants, the US and China, India and Turkey deserve close attention.

Where are we headed?

One thing is certain: the die is cast. The world of 2060 will look nothing like today’s. The time of “happy globalization” is long gone. The age of violent conflict has returned (7).

In this world, we will have to regain our fighting posture.

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_{'HYPERWAR' is the fifth and last post of our 'Future of War' series. The previous posts of this series, 'WARFARE 6.0', 'MIND WARS', 'RACE AGAINST THE MACHINES', and 'THE NEW GREAT GAME' can be found here >}  

_{(1) As the prominent think tank SIPRI points out in its latest yearbook, "Nuclear Risks Grow as New Arms Race Looms," the credibility of nuclear deterrence is eroding. After 80 years of precarious balance of terror, the spread of tactical nuclear weapons and the steady expansion of the nuclear club—official powers (China, France, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom), de facto nuclear states (North Korea, India, Israel, Pakistan), and others contemplating the bomb—are reshaping the strategic landscape. As we noted in "Back to the Unthinkable" military leaders are increasingly engaged in debates over the potential use of preventive or tactical nuclear strikes. One sign of the times among many: the Russian geopolitical analyst Sergei Karaganov recently argued in Russia in Global Affairs that Russia shouldn't hesitate to carry out preemptive nuclear strikes in Europe in order to halt Europe's growing involvement in the NATO-Russia conflict in Ukraine.}

_{(2) Despite warlike rhetoric—renaming the "Ministry of Defense" as the "Ministry of War," plans to raise the U.S. defense budget to $1 trillion by 2026, and the remobilization of senior military leaders around a spirit of combat—the draft of the 2025 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), currently being developed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, emphasizes prioritizing the protection of the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere. Guided by the principles of "Peace Through Strength" and "America First," it envisions reducing U.S. commitments and resources in the Indo-Pacific and drawing down troop levels in the Middle East and Europe in order to consolidate efforts closer to home—including in Latin America, often described as "America's backyard." The strategy notably elevates domestic and regional missions, such as border security, interdicting drug flows (for example, fentanyl from cartels), countering non-state threats like gangs, and addressing criminal activities in Latin America. This includes ongoing actions such as deploying National Guard troops for law enforcement support, militarizing the southern border with Mexico, and conducting strikes against suspected drug vessels in the Caribbean. This represents a major shift from previous NDS strategies, which highlighted China as the primary pacing challenge.}

_{(3) Due to its recent Maoist past, there are many misconceptions about China. For millennia, China cultivated a communitarian culture, shaped by its geography, requiring the development of large-scale collective irrigation projects and defense efforts against invasions from the heartland's nomadic tribes. Thousands of years before democratic Europe, it developed authoritarian yet meritocratic imperial governing structures for this purpose, based on a class of state functionaries selected through competitive examination and Confucian values centered on education, discipline, and hard work. At the same time, Chinese society was simultaneously marked by violent Darwinian selection due to a land overpopulated to the absolute limits of subsistence, repeatedly struck by frequent and deadly famines. As American analyst Ron Unz emphasizes in a polemical yet highly illuminating article, "The Racial Roots of China's Rise," this singular culture—combining collective governance, meritocratic social mobility, and violent Darwinian selection—made China the world's foremost power until the eighteenth century. This underscores the exceptional nature of its eclipse during the "Great Divergence," which saw China gradually lose ground to Western technological modernity, from the humiliation of unequal treaties to Japanese occupation to the Maoist catastrophe (civil war, Great Leap Forward, permanent revolution), while its expatriates thrived everywhere else, notably in Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore). As the specialized analysis firm Gavekal emphasizes, China's success since Deng Xiaoping did not come by chance. Rather, it is the resurgence of a millennial culture combining both long-term planning and hyper-competitive entrepreneurship, which gradually reasserts its rightful place through successive liberalizations.}

_{(4) While primarily economic—even if it develops its army at full speed, as commentators acknowledge after the recent celebration of its victory against Japan—China's renewal is no less conquering. One can recall that the world's most famous military strategy book is Chinese: Sun Tzu's Art of War, written following the conflicts of the Warring States. Mao's Little Red Book prominently advocates patience, guerrilla warfare, and the exploitation of an adversary's contradictions to vanquish enemies through prolonged attrition wars over the long run. In this domain, one cannot help but consider how China currently promotes free trade and criticizes American protectionism now that it dominates industrially, after having fiercely protected its own market for decades. Last but not least, it is revealing to note how much the global success of the Chinese novels "Three-Body Problem" and "Dark Forest," marked by themes of deception, concealment, and preemptive total extermination of any rival civilization, testifies to a collective unconscious far removed from the desire for peaceful and harmonious co-development so prominently featured in Beijing's diplomatic communications...}

_{(5) Peter Turchin is the founder of Cliodynamics, which we covered in our "History's Formula" post. In his newest book, "The Great Holocene Transformation", Peter Turchin examines the sweeping changes over the last approximately 10,000 years (the Holocene) by which human societies evolved from small bands of foragers into sprawling, state-based civilizations. His central thesis in the book is that the dominant driver of that transformation was competition between societies—especially warfare—which selected through "Cultural Multilevel Selection" societies that developed better internal coordination, governance, ideology, and institutions compared to their rivals. We highlighted some geopolitical implications in our latest post: "The New Great Game."}

_{(6) As Emmanuel Todd points out in "Lineages of Modernity: A History of Humanity from the Stone Age to Homo Americanus," civilizations have been built on deep cultural foundations, of which family systems constitute the persistent echoes. Unlike the stem or community family structures that gradually emerged in the Middle East, China, India, and Central Europe under demographic, economic, and military pressures, the Western European peripheries have generally preserved until now nuclear family forms close to those of original human groups. Their characteristics—culture of freedom, innovation, and individual initiative—have fostered permanent competition among rival kingdoms and cities, amplified by mass literacy under the impetus of the Reformation, leading to the technical and industrial revolution of modernity. In contrast to the great millennial empires (China, Iran, India...), conceived over the long term and marked by cycles of collapse and rapid reformation, Western culture is at once more individualistic, shorter-sighted, more erratic—yet also driven by a stronger will to transcend limits, as Spengler observed when he called it a "Faustian" civilization. Though it now finds itself in the midst of a secular and generational crisis, nothing says it could not rebound in a few decades after a period of chaos—likely painful but inevitable.}

_{(7) We could recall a stark anecdote we covered in our "A Tale of Two Continents" posts: In 1997, at the conclusion of the Davos World Economic Forum dedicated to the world of tomorrow, representatives from each continent were asked to describe which would be the major continent of the 21st century. After each representative—American, Asian, South American, and African—had argued in favor of their own continent, the European representative of the time advocated for the vision of a world finally united and pacified after centuries of combat and war, and of a Europe ready to collaborate with everyone for an inclusive future. To his surprise, he was firmly answered by the Asian representative, to the applause of the audience, that for decadent Europe, the 21st century would be "a century of iron, fire, and blood," where the world "would come to crush it."}